Click on each case link to read entire opinion
520 U.S. 518 (1997)
Lambrix asserts several reasons why procedural bar does not apply, the validity *519 of which is more appropriately determined by the lower federal courts, which are more familiar with the procedural practices of the States in which they sit. Rather than prolong this litigation by a remand, the Court proceeds to decide the question presented. Pp. 1522-1524.
698 So.2d 247 (Fla. 1996)
In any event, in a previous pro se petition, Lambrix raised a claim of ineffective assistance of collateral counsel which was denied. Lambrix, 559 So.2d at 1138. Successive claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on different grounds are not permitted. Aldridge v. State, 503 So.2d 1257 (Fla.1987).
Lambrix's claims are procedurally barred. We affirm the trial court's order denying the motion for postconviction relief.
72 F. 3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1996)
The Court of Appeals, Anderson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) claim that jury was not given sufficient guidance in evaluating two aggravating factors was barred under Teague ; (2) counsel's failure to present, during penalty phase, mitigating evidence on petitioner's chemical dependence or on abuse suffered by petitioner as child was not ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) appellate counsel's failure to present sentencing issues was not ineffective assistance; (4) second trial conducted after first trial ended in mistrial was not barred by double jeopardy; and (5) petitioner was not denied fundamental right to testify.
529 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 1988)
evidence was not sufficient to show intoxication. Because we cannot say that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to voluntary intoxication, appellate counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise the issue.
Petitioner's other arguments either have no merit or have been raised before. There being no basis for relief, we deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
494 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 1986)
After a careful review of the record, we agree with the trial judge and all of the parties involved that five aggravating circumstances apply to the murder of Moore and four aggravating circumstances apply to the murder of Bryant. The circumstance that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain only applied to the murder of Moore because, following the murder, Lambrix stole Moore's automobile.
Accordingly, we affirm both of Lambrix' convictions and sentences.
